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Thoughts on Medellín v. Texas
Kristofer Monson *
This article explores how the Supreme Court’s decision in
Medellín v. Texas affected the scope of presidential powers.
After analyzing the Court’s rationale and discussing the history
of the role of states in treaty ratification, the article ultimately
concludes that the Medellín decision properly restricts the ability
of the president to bring non-self-executing treaties into force.
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I. Introduction
At the end of World War II, the victorious Allies imposed a
constitution on Japan. 1 The Japanese constitution makes treaties
entered into by the government automatically supersede contrary
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1.

Lynn Parisi, Lessons on the Japanese Constitution, JAPAN DIGEST, Nov.
2002, available at http://iis-db.stanford.edu/docs/131/const.pdf.
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domestic law. 2 This approach made sense: elements of the defeated
Empire were unwilling to accept defeat, and the automatic domestic
application of international agreements would quell efforts by
hardliners in local, regional, and even the national government from
reasserting the ultra-nationalist system displaced by peace in the
Pacific.
Automatically incorporating multi-national legal norms into
domestic law, without further action by domestic policy makers,
undoes local political control and power. This is true not only in the
international sense, but also internally. It has always been the
province of the foreign affairs branch of a sovereign government to
honor (or breach) its obligations as it sees fit. It is at least logical
(although perhaps politically unworkable) to assume that the
executive department of a government could dictate domestic policy
in implementing this automatically binding international law.
This analysis is further complicated by the fact that most
international agreements are at least initially appealing in the
abstract. For example, it is hard to argue against the Kellogg-Briand
Pact’s asserted goal of making international war “illegal.”3
International agreements often include such teleological goal setting,
seeking to establish international standards on issues such as fair
wages, 4 the right of self-determination, 5 and sharing natural
resources. 6 And yet, these noble objectives are often the same things
duly-elected (or for that matter, appointed or hereditary)
governments are charged with protecting. Government is in the
business of ironing out policy differences that create different interests
within the population they represent. Erasing domestic procedures for
hashing out these policy differences in favor of achieving an abstract
goal, however desirable, creates the impression that the practical
impediments to implementing the new policy can be swept aside by
its power as an abstract idea. After all, Kellogg-Briand did not work
out so well. 7
2.

See NHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 98 (Japan) (“The
treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of nations shall be
faithfully observed.”).

3.

See Kellogg-Briand Pact, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.

4.

See, e.g., Convention Concerning Minimum Wage Fixing, with Special
Reference to Developing Countries, June 22, 1970, ILO No. 131.

5.

See, e.g., A. A. Idowu, Revisiting the Right to Self-Determination in
Modern International Law: Implications for African States, 6 EUR. J.
SOC. SCI. 43, 43 (2008) (describing the right to self-determination as “a
fundamental principle of International Law”).

6.

See, e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760
U.N.T.S. 79.

7.

See Robert J. Delahunty, Paper Charter: Self-Defense and the Failure
of the United Nations Collective Security System, 56 CATH. U. L. REV.
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II. Background
Medellín v. Texas, using the traditional tools for resolving
disputes between the executive and judicial branches in the U.S.
system, addressed the difficulty of implementing treaty obligations
into domestic law in the context of the U.S. Constitution. The
Medellín majority looked to the text of various international
agreements to determine their meaning, an approach the Court
justified, in part, by pointing out that plain-text analysis gives
greatest effect to the power of the president to pull out of
international obligations as appropriate and to the power of Congress
to adopt laws that supersede treaty obligations. 8
But there is another dynamic at play in the case law governing
the internal application of treaty law—the relationship between the
states and the federal government. I do not mean to suggest that the
states’ residual sovereignty somehow overrides federal law establishing
international obligations. Rather, I want to investigate the meaning of
the president’s obligation to consult the Senate before entering into
treaties. Judicial interpretation of the abstract ideas in international
treaties should not, I submit, be a source of power for either the
executive or the judicial branch to make new policies out of whole
cloth in the service of abstract principles. This is not only an issue of
the relationship between the people of the United States and the
federal government, but also of the relationship between the federal
government and the states.
Until the Seventeenth Amendment, the Senate’s role in
ratification of treaties could be seen as involving the states in the
treaty-making process. 9 The senators represented the state legislatures
and, as a result, the institutional interests of the state governments. It
is only after the Senate became a popularly elected body that the
interest of the states, as entities, was severed out of the Constitution’s
schematic diagram for the exercise of the foreign affairs power. 10 Any
understanding of the nature of the president’s power with regard to
treaties should be understood with regard to the fact that the nature
871, 898−99 (2007) (explaining that the Kellogg-Briand Pact was
intended to prevent future wars but ultimately failed to do so).
8.

Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 494 (2008) (discussing Congress’
responsibility to monitor the president).

9.

See Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct Election: A
Structural Examination of the Seventeenth Amendment, 49 VAND. L.
REV. 1347, 1359–60 (1996) (suggesting the Seventeenth Amendment led
to more senators who had previously served or would go onto serve in
executive agencies, particularly in Cabinet positions, which
demonstrates a shift in the power and interests of the Senate).

10.

See id. at 1349 (explaining that since the passage of the Seventeenth
Amendment, states have less power to advance their own interests).
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of the entity with which the president must act in concert to effect a
treaty obligation has changed significantly.

III. MEDELLÍN V. TEXAS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
TREATY IMPLEMENTATION
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Medellín v. Texas,
focused on two legal questions: (1) whether the International Court of
Justice’s (ICJ) Avena decision was enforceable domestic federal law
that preempted contrary state law, 11 and (2) whether a memorandum
from the president to the attorney general of the United States, which
stated that the United States would discharge its international
obligations by having state courts give effect to the Avena decision,
was binding federal law that required the states to provide
reconsideration and review of capital sentences without regard to
state procedural-default rules. 12
A. ICJ Decisions Are Not Self-Executing

Medellín had argued that a treaty becomes law automatically
once it is ratified and, therefore, the Court’s power to interpret and
apply the law was no different from its power to interpret and apply
other laws. 13 By virtue of the Supremacy Clause, Medellín argued, the
ICJ’s Avena decision was directly binding on the state courts. 14 The
majority rejected this argument, holding that, in order to be adopted
as the law of the United States, a treaty must be “self-executing,”
meaning that its text manifests an intent to undertake a domestic and
substantive obligation, as opposed to a mere diplomatic and
international obligation. 15 Substantive domestic law governs court
decisions. International diplomatic obligations are a matter for the
executive branch to honor or disavow as it sees fit. Given that it is
international practice not to treat international obligations as
domestic legal norms, 16 it would make little sense to interpret a treaty
as self-executing as a background matter.
11.

See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 491−92 (discussing the enforceability of the
ICJ’s Avena decision in state court). See also Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31).

12.

See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 536 (discussing the validity of attempts to
implement international obligations through presidential memorandum).

13.

See id. at 504.

14.

Id.

15.

Id. at 505 n.2.

16.

See id. at 522 (“The general rule, however, is that judgments of foreign
courts awarding injunctive relief, even as to private parties, let along
sovereign States, ‘are not generally entitled to enforcement.’” (citing
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 481 (1987)).
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Medellín further argued that the treaty was self-executing by
virtue of the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention. 17 Texas
rebutted this argument by pointing out that the Optional Protocol is
an accession to jurisdiction but does not otherwise enlarge the ICJ’s
remedial powers. 18 The Court determined that Article 94 of the UN
Charter circumscribes the scope of the ICJ’s remedial powers and that
the Rome Statute limited jurisdiction to diplomatic disputes and did
not extend jurisdiction over individuals; therefore the relief Medellín
sought was outside the ICJ’s authority. 19 Any available ICJ remedies
are diplomatic (i.e., nonjudicial) and as a result are subject to the
ordinary limits of diplomatic action including the United States’
ability to veto enactments of the Security Council, the UN body with
the greatest coercive power under the Charter. 20 The majority further
pointed out that Medellín’s argument was contrary to international
understanding of ICJ jurisdiction and interpretation of the Vienna
Convention. 21
The majority rounded out its treatment of ICJ jurisdiction by
pointing out that Medellín’s position would render any treaty
obligation both binding as a matter of domestic law and politically
unassailable, because there is no recourse. 22 The Court concluded,
“Our cases simply require courts to decide whether a treaty’s terms
reflect a determination by the President who negotiated it and the
Senate that confirmed it that the treaty has domestic effect.” 23
Justice Breyer’s dissent, by contrast, advocated a case-by-case
approach, using a seven-part test to evaluate whether a treaty is
enforceable if it conflicts with a particular state-court judgment. 24 He
17.

Id. at 506.

18.

See id. at 507–08 (“The Protocol says nothing about the effect of an ICJ
decision and does not itself commit signatories to comply with an ICJ
judgment. The Protocol is similarly silent as to any enforcement
mechanism.”).

19.

See id. at 508.

20.

Id. at 509. See also The Security Council, UNITED NATIONS SECURITY
COUNCIL, http://www.un.org/en/sc/(last visited Jan. 13, 2013) (“Under
the Charter, the Security Council has primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security.”).

21.

Medellín, 552 U.S. at 516 n.10. Justice Stevens, in his concurrence,
would have held that Article 94 resulted in a self-executing requirement
to follow international law because it does not contain affirmative
language precluding self-execution, but that enforcement of this selfexecuting obligation is conferred on the political branches rather than
the courts.

22.

Id. at 517–18.

23.

Id. at 521.

24.

See id. at 549–551 (outlining Justice Breyer’s test and the need for
context-specific evaluations).
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would have justified this case-by-case approach by reference to all the
cases in which a litigant has successfully relied on a treaty in
litigation. 25 Essentially, the dissent’s position was that because other
treaties create self-executing obligations, the Court could not hold
that the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional
Protocol to the Vienna Convention do not create a self-executing
obligation without undermining those other treaties. To Justice
Breyer, this would create the possibility that a single state could
resist an international obligation undertaken by the federal
government, in contravention of the Supremacy Clause. 26 He suggests
that the Senate was considering broad international obligations, not
“bread-and-butter” judgments involving individuals. 27
Responding to the dissent’s arguments that general principles of
international law put a close textual analysis of the relevant
documents at odds with the international consensus on how to
interpret treaties, the majority pointed out that paying close attention
to the text of treaties has always been at the heart of treaty
analysis. 28 The majority emphasized the interaction between the
president and Congress, focusing on the procedural requirements for
creating federal law.
B. Lack of Presidential Authority to Transform a Non-Self-Executing
Treaty into Federal Law Through an Executive Memorandum

The Medellín Court relied on a more functionalist approach to
determine whether the president could, by issuing a memorandum to
the attorney general, impose federal legal requirements directly on the
states. Cautioning that the dissent framed the issue incorrectly, the
majority emphasized that the question was whether the president’s
memorandum created federal law capable of displacing state law
under the Supremacy Clause. 29 Invoking the three-part Youngstown
test, the majority concluded that a non-self-executing treaty cannot
25.

Id. at 547–48. Of course, those cases all involved textual analysis of the
relevant treaty. See id. at 492 (noting that the Court’s textual approach
is “hardly novel”).

26.

Id. at 554.

27.

Id. Justice Breyer’s reasoning is somewhat undercut by his failure to
recognize that the ICJ’s own statute precludes it from considering cases
involving individuals. See Rome Statue of the Court of International
Justice, art. 34, ¶ 1, July 1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (“Only states may
be parties in cases before the Court.”).

28.

See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 513 (contrasting Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253
(1829) with United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51 (1833)).

29.

See id. at 523 n.13 (stating that the dissent refrained from deciding the
limited issue of whether the president’s memorandum created federal
law pursuant to either the non-self-executing treaty or other
Constitutional authority).
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give a president independent authority to make a treaty’s provisions
self-executing. 30 That requires an act of Congress. 31 Chief Justice
Roberts’s opinion articulates a clear distinction between executing
and making law. 32 To make law, Congress must act either through the
Senate’s ratification or by enactment of a statute implementing an
otherwise non-self-executing treaty. 33 The Court rejected the idea of
congressional acquiescence because the president acted in the face of
the two express grants of power that required congressional
involvement. It likewise rejected the proposition that there was
congressional acquiescence to the president’s authority to resolve
diplomatic disputes with other nations through a claims-settlement
process.
The Court framed the resolution of both questions in terms of the
scope of executive branch power. Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion
discusses the treaties at issue as being “negotiated by the President
and signed by Congress.” 34 In rebutting the dissent’s argument that
the Court should not use textual analysis of a treaty to determine
whether it is “self-executing,” the Chief Justice’s opinion focuses on
the historic context.

IV. Analysis of the Supreme Court’s Reasoning
The dissent’s position was untenable—precedent clearly requires
adherence to a treaty’s text. What’s interesting about the dissent’s
approach, and Medellìn’s position that treaties are generally selfexecuting in the United States, is that there might have been a better
argument for automatic self-execution prior to the adoption of the
Seventeenth Amendment. Thinking about self-execution in that light,
and analyzing the scope of the president’s foreign affairs power in
contrast to the Senate’s, gives further insight into why the Medellìn
30.

See id. at 524–30 (“[T]he non-self-executing character of a treaty
constrains the President’s ability to comply with treaty commitments by
unilaterally making the treaty binding on domestic courts.”).

31.

See id. at 527 (“[G]iving domestic effect to an international treaty
obligation under the Constitution—for making law—requires joint
action by the Executive and Legislative Branches: The Senate can ratify
a self-executing treaty ‘ma[de]’ by the Executive, or, if the ratified
treaty is not self-executing, Congress can enact implementing legislation
approved by the President.”).

32.

See id. at 526 (“The requirement that Congress, rather than the
President, implement a non-self-executing treaty derives from the text of
the Constitution, which divides the treaty-making power between the
President and the Senate. The Constitution vests the President with the
authority to ‘make’ a treaty.” (internal citation omitted)).

33.

Id.

34.

Id. at 512 n.8.
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decision improves democratic accountability and responsible decision
making.
It is the form of the arguments about the scope of the president’s
foreign affairs power that is intriguing. The majority views the
president’s power over foreign affairs as subject to express
constitutional limitations on the mechanisms for creating federal law.
By contrast, the dissent argues that complexity is required to protect
simplicity. If a treaty looks like law, there must be a seven-part test
by which the courts can sort it out. The majority assumes that both
the executive and judicial branches are secondary to Congress’s power
to make federal law, while Justice Breyer’s dissent presumes that
because treaties are considered to be law, they are subject to judicial
review, albeit with deference to the executive branch’s reasoned
interpretation.
The opinions describe the scope of the foreign affairs power as a
series of adjustments of the balance of powers between the branches
of the federal government. Yet the underlying issue was whether the
president could—in the exercise of his foreign affairs power under
either the Vienna Convention or as a background matter—supplant
the procedural requirements of state law. The omission is striking,
giving the general deference accorded state procedural and
substantive law by the federal courts, in light of the inherent
limitations placed on the federal judicial power by Article III of the
Constitution. 35 Considering the role of the states as separate entities
underscores the issue. As Justice Breyer pointed out in his dissent,
and the victorious Allies knew when they drafted the Japanese
constitution, a requirement that treaty obligations be directly
incorporated into domestic law precludes the possibility that local
political activity could undermine the expressed foreign policy goals of
the federal government. That kind of limitation makes sense if you’re
worried about a uniform trade-sanctions regime or suppressing
imperialist coups in a newly-defeated empire. It doesn’t make as much
sense when you’re talking about elected officials implementing the
duly-enacted law of the land.

V. STATE INVOLVEMENT IN RATIFICATION OF TREATIES
Justice Breyer’s focus on the Supremacy Clause raises an
important question: what if the states were directly involved in the
ratification of treaties? At one point, they were. Prior to the
enactment of the Seventeenth Amendment, senators were elected by
the state legislatures and represented the interests of those
legislatures.

35.

See U.S. CONST. art III.
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If this were a David McCullough book (if you’ve read this far, I
hope for your sake that you wish it were), I would launch into a
tightly drawn profile of some policy maker who spearheaded (or
fought) ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment. This is not such a
book. And there is little fodder for a lawyer to build an argument
about the Seventeenth Amendment’s impact on the states’ role in
foreign affairs. The issue doesn’t really appear in the Congressional
Record. 36 It is at least implied by the general narrative of the
Seventeenth Amendment’s history. The Senate was designed to
forestall concerns that the creation of a federal government would
completely disenfranchise the states. The state legislatures retained
authority to “instruct” their senators on how to vote on treaties. 37
But the discussion of the amendment doesn’t seem relevant to the
broader issue of the states’ participation in the federal government as
corporate entities protecting their own residual sovereignty.
State participation does show up, however, in a key distinction in
the case law Justice Breyer’s highlights in his dissent and the
appendix. Justice Breyer correctly notes that the nineteenth-century
self-execution cases do not elaborate a grand theory of self-execution,
nor do they look for particular textual indicia of self-execution. For
example, in early extradition case law, the Court treated the adoption
of the rule of “specialty,” a term of art in international extradition
law, as being specifically invoked by a treaty. 38 The cases drew a
strict distinction between the rights of the contracting parties (i.e.,
the signatory governments) and their citizens. 39 But the law was clear
that the impact of a treaty should derive from its articulation of
particular private rights, because in granting individuals particular
rights, such as “rights of property by descent or inheritance,” the
entities signing the agreement undertook to guarantee those rights to
individuals. 40
36.

See generally H.R.J. Res. 39, 62d Cong. (1911) (enacted).

37.

See Todd. J. Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests: A Public Choice
Analysis of the Seventeenth Amendment, 73 OR. L. REV. 1007, 1036
(1994) (noting the historical practice of state governments “instructing”
their state senators).

38.

See United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886); Johnson v. Browne,
205 U.S. 309, 320–22 (1907).

39.

In Wildenuhus’s Case, 120 U.S. 1 (1887), for example the Belgian
Consul sought to bring a habeas corpus claim regarding a suspect in a
murder committed aboard a Belgian vessel anchored in a U.S. port. In
holding that the consul held a right under the bilateral consularrelations treaty between the United States and Belgium, the Court
recognized that the treaty “settle[d] and define[d] the rights and duties
of the contracting parties,” id. at 12, and not those of the individual
criminal suspect.

40.

Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 418–19.
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Justice Breyer’s understanding that these treaties create areas of
law in which the courts were then free to recognize particular
obligations as binding on the states would have had more purchase
before the Seventeenth Amendment. The states would have had the
opportunity, through the instruction process, to have their say on the
subject-matter of treaties ratified by the Senate. The subject matter
of those treaties would have potentially been a proper subject for
federal judicial oversight, having been ceded by the states in a process
that involved participation of their corporate representatives, the
members of the Senate. The lack of careful analysis of self-execution
prior to the Seventeenth Amendment may be explained by the fact
that the states had at least some power to fend off ratification of
treaties to which the majority of them could not agree.
Judge Jay Bybee has argued that the ratification of the
Seventeenth Amendment resulted in a significant change in the
balance of state and federal power: because the senators were now
accountable to a generalized electorate, they were motivated to enact
new federal law and exercise federal power, whereas when they had
been obligated to the state legislatures, they had an incentive to
restrict the scope of federal government. 41 As Judge Bybee points out,
the Seventeenth Amendment changed the states’ relationship to the
treaty process. A necessary corollary of the fact that the states had a
greater role in treaty ratification prior to the Seventeenth
Amendment is that the courts’ treatment of treaties would be
different.
Before the change, it would have made more sense to apply
Justice Breyer’s approach to the case law governing self-executing
treaties. Cases like United States v. Rauscher do not engage in
substantial textual analysis in part because the meaning of the treaty
was self-evident and in part because there was no question that the
states, through the Senate, had consented to the terms of the treaty
with Great Britain. 42 But after the Seventeenth Amendment, we are
in a world in which there is no separate institutional interest
represented in the foreign affairs process—the president and the
Senate are creatures solely of the federal government and do not
represent the interest of the states. If the foreign affairs power is
collapsed into horse trading between federal government officials, the
states are left in the dust. All the more reason to adopt a more
stringent analytical approach to treaties.
41.

Jay Bybee, Ulysses at the Mast: Democracy, Federalism, and the Siren
Song of the Seventeenth Amendment, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 500, 560–61
(1997).

42.

See Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 418–19 (discussing how treaties become the
law of the land for citizens of the United States when Congress passes
enacting legislation or the Senate ratifies the treaty).

398

CaseWestern Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012
Thoughts on Medellín v. Texas

Critics of the Medellìn decision argue that by imposing a judicial
plain-text gloss on a treaty’s implementation the Court bypassed the
Supremacy Clause and failed to give effect to something that should
have automatically become legally binding. 43 Critics also argue that
the prior case law on the interpretation of treaties never engaged in
this kind of analysis. 44 And some argue that Medellìn is a unique case
because of its bad facts and will have little impact on treatyinterpretation precedent. 45 These criticisms are rooted in public
international law and do not appreciate how the courts interpret
statutes and administrative rules. After all, neither the majority nor
the dissent in Medellìn questioned the fact that it was up to a court
to decide whether and to what extent a statutory requirement is selfexecuting: they parted ways on the framing of the analysis, not its
necessity.
There is more to determining how federal law impacts the states
than simply looking at the text of a statute. And it is the province of
the courts to say what the law of the United States actually is. In a
more run-of-the-mill case, the Court would still have to deal with
federalism concerns such as whether Congress met the minimum
requirements for preempting state law and whether Congress properly
invoked an enumerated power. The tests that embody each of those
concerns rely on assessing the degree of clarity with which a
document reaches its goals. Medellín merely extends the practices that
underlie statutory construction to the determination of whether a
treaty creates an individual procedural right.
That treaties creating procedural rights are rare—and arguably
non-existent, given that the Vienna Convention itself did not impose
a right to procedural reconsideration of criminal convictions—is what
makes Medellín most likely to be a one-off decision. The federal
government has always been careful not to intervene in state criminal

43.

See, e.g., Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The
Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV.
L. REV. 599, 648 (2008) (“The Medellín majority did not attempt to
square the view that non-self-executing treaties lack the force of
domestic law with the text of the Supremacy Clause.”).

44.

See, e.g., id. at 648–649 (asserting that the Court had no legal basis for
denying the force of domestic law to a treaty that imposes an obligation
on the United States that is not beyond the treaty power and has not
been superseded by a statute).

45.

See, e.g., See Lucy Reed, President, Am. Soc’y of Int’l Law, Talk Given
at Malaysian Chapter of Asian Soc’y of Int’l Law: Treaties in U.S.
Domestic Law: Medellín v. Texas in Context 6 (Aug. 7, 2008), available
at http://www.asil.org/files/lucy-malaysia.pdf (examining the open,
unanswered questions of the Medellín opinion and its singular,
unpleasant fact pattern).
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procedure. 46 But that does not make the decision meaningless. It sets
an outer limit on what changes in domestic law an ambiguously
drafted treaty can create. This is analytically consistent with treatyinterpretation precedent, moreover, because it merely looks for a
textual indication that a treaty creates an identifiable right before
enforcing that right as a matter of law. If a treaty on its face creates
such a right, there’s no need to go to the edges of analytical
possibility to determine its meaning.

VI. Conclusion
H.L.A. Hart described law as rules that are validated and
enforceable because of their pedigree. 47 This view is deeply rooted in
the Anglo-American tradition of laws. By contrast, in the civil law
tradition, law is seen as the application of universal principles in
particular circumstances. 48 Treaties offer us an interesting crosssection of the two approaches. The type of bilateral trade and
commerce treaties that have always governed world trade, sometimes
thought of as “private” international law, have been treated as selfexecuting as a matter of course. 49 If sovereigns are negotiating rights
for their nationals abroad, that marks the substance of the
negotiation. By contrast, many twentieth-century treaties embody
abstract concepts like peace and self-determination. 50 It is not entirely
clear what the negotiating parties specifically intended. If a court
treats the second kind of aspirational principle as a source of law, it
bypasses the mechanisms by which domestic political bodies
implement policies that balance the competing policy interests
brought to bear by the democratic process.
46.

See, e.g., Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 118, 120 (1951) (holding that
“the federal courts should refuse to intervene in State criminal
proceedings to suppress the use of evidence even when claimed to have
been secured by unlawful search and seizure”).

47.

See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994)
(explaining that rules supply criteria of validity, also known as pedigree,
which refers to how laws are created or adopted).

48.

James G. Apple & Robert P.
System 22 (Fed. Judicial Ctr.
emphasize form, structure, and
concrete principles of law within

49.

See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 552, 554, 559, 569–75 (2008)
(noting the Court typically finds various commercial and trade-matter
treaty provisions to be self-executing).

50.

See, e.g., Treaty of Peace at Versailles, arts. 11, 87, 433, June 28, 1919,
Ger.-Allies, 225 Consol. T. S. 188 (promoting international peace by
ending World War I and encouraging self-determination through the
creation of Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania).

Deyling, A Primer on the Civil-Law
Paper, 1995) (“The civil codes . . .
the enumeration of both abstract and
a uniﬁed whole.”).
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The best judicial tool for determining the effect of treaties has to
be plain-text analysis. The parties to an international agreement
chose particular language, at a particular time, for a particular
purpose. In the U.S. system, those choices can be second guessed by
other bodies, such as the president acting alone, or the Congress
acting as a whole, but the content of a treaty will never be revisited
by the same entity that initially ratified it: the president acting
together with the Senate.
Textual analysis safeguards the U.S. Constitution’s particularized
design of creating a pedigree by which laws would be adopted.
Focusing closely on the text used by the decision makers helps courts
to cleave most closely to the source of law’s coercive power—the
process by which the decision-making body was empowered to make a
decision in the first place. Stripping concepts of the words in which
they are expressed, as Justice Breyer would do, unmoors legal
principles from what gives them authority. The ultimate purpose of
the courts is to set up a predictable system that hews closely to text,
because the text is the only way to tie a concept to a pedigree that
makes it a law.

401

